

24 July 1952

MEMORANDUM

TO:

FROM:

SUBJECT: AECOB log for 22 July 1952

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08:30 to 09:00 -- Meeting between []

09:00-- [] and [] go to [] hotel to check out.

10:30-- Arrived at operational house. Agents were occupied with Commo. [] exchanged pleasantries with CAMBARO 2 and then discussed CAMBARO 2's future in the states and the break-up of the SC, especially CAMBARO 3's reactions CAMBARO 2 was made to understand that he will leave the agents and the operational house on the evening of July 23.

11:45-- [] met the CAMUSOS and exchanged pleasantries.

12:00-- Lunch with light talk and much good humor.

12:40-- Everybody listened to Latvian records which [] had brought with him. This was accompanied with more introductory small talk.

13:40-- [] addressed the CAMUSOS and CAMBARO 2. The following points were brought out:

(1) From here on out strict compartmentation will be observed. There is to be no discussion of the operation between agents except on a need to know basis. No talking at meals or when the house-keeping couple is present.

(2) The U.S. is prepared to give full aid to all the Latvian opposition elements. The group was told that each agent would carry something for the underground, the specifics being disclosed later. Everyone was happy to hear this and there was a visible air of relief.

(3) The agents brought up again the point of a Latvian Political Nationalist background to the operation. [] reemphasized the points made in his last visit, that the U.S. is not responsible to any political group and assumes full responsibility for what is done at our direction in Latvia. It was reemphasized that the CAMUSOS were putting themselves at U.S. disposal because there is no Latvian Central united emigre group capable of undertaking operations into Latvia and that U.S. was the obvious and only way out of their dilemma.

[] again assured the CAMUSOS that CAMBARO 2 will continue to work for American Intelligence.

(4) Exfiltration-- [] mentioned the feasibility of exfiltrating key people from Latvia.

(5) The CAMUSOS are to accept no-one, with whatever authenticators, claiming to have U.S. ties unless that person has a VOA authenticator similar to what the CAMUSOS have or unless they are instructed re such by W/T.

(6) The CAMUSOS Are to avoid Lianaja.

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(7) The CAMUSOS asked if the U.S.A. authenticator plan had been lengthened for the new operation. [] answered that it had been extended into December. The CAMUSOS were pleased and expressed confidence in this plan since they have followed it closely on VOA broadcasts to date and see that it works.

(8) After a confirmation of agreement on the foregoing points [] said that he would now talk to the CAMUSOS separately.

14:40-- Talk with CAMUSO 1 [] came quickly and frankly to the point saying that CAMUSO 1 must accept complete control by CAMUSO 2. [] emphasized that Riga is the heart of the Latvian opposition elements and therefore has high priority as a target. He further stated that C-2 would be useless without communications and therefore, if C-1 did not buy the plan neither C-1 or C-2 would go in.

This whole plan was a psychological shock to C-1. He had previously understood that he would probably be C-2's W/T base but that he would be operationally independent. He was crushed by the idea that he was to be a mere technician, a W/T man. He finally agreed to accept his fate for the good of the operation.

At this point [] started to build him up saying that C-1 would have complete freedom in locating his base and recruiting a support net in his immediate operational area. [] argued for his plan in this way. Since Riga was the heart of Latvian resistance elements, C-2 had the best opportunity of contacting the resistance in its highest levels there. C-2 would become a liaison link with these resistance hqtrs and thus he would be able to direct C-1's activities along lines compatible to the resistance. [] continually hammered the idea that C-1's primary mission was to support C-2 in every manner. At first this would probably be exclusively as a W/T man but that as the operation grew his functions would undoubtedly be enlarged. C-1's secondary mission is to build a support organization in the Talsi, Sabile, Tukums triangle. C-1 offered baseless opposition and squirmed on almost every point, but finally accepted [] plan without reservation until he finally reversed himself completely and claimed that [] plan was actually the same as his own had originally been. His emotional disturbance during the first part of the interview was obvious to [] he appeared on the brink of tears two or three times.

CAMUSO 1 agreed not to try to contact the partisans and not to work west of Sabile-Talsi and to generally confine his activities to the Talsi-Tukums Sabile triangle. He was very happy to hear that he was to carry in and cache 100,000 roses for the partisans. This aid he feels, discharges his self-imposed obligation to help the partisans. Thus CAMUSO 1 has accepted the principles of [] plan in general. It now remains to work out the details.

16:40-- Talk with CAMUSO 2 [] opened the discussion by showing C-2 the aerial photos of Dole Island; C-2 was much impressed by them. Then [] explained that C-1 and C-2 were to be a team: that CAMUSO 2 would be leader and that C-1 would set up in the Tukums area. [] then explained quite frankly to C-2 why it was necessary that C-2 completely control C-1. [] said that he must have complete assurance from C-2 that he could control C-1. C-2 answered that he would try his best to control C-1 and thought that he could do the job. C-2 brought up the point that the pressure in Latvia would push C-1 into C-2's control rather than away from it. C-2

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also expressed the idea that friendship would be more affective means of achieving control than bare authority, to which [] agreed. C-2 further brought out that during the last 5 or 6 weeks while [] was absent he, C-2 had about 85% control over C-1 as regards drinking and precipitous actions. During the foregoing conversation [] asked C-2 if he would go in without C-1. C-2 answered, no. [] thought that C-2's emotional reaction indicated that [] could probably talk C-2 into going without C-1 in 2 or 3 months, but that the emotional strain would cause the team (then only CAMUSOS 2 & 3) to disintegrate and become completely ineffective.

C-2 also had doubts about the propriety of being C-1's chief in as much as C-1 was a former officer. But when told that C-1 had already agreed to these terms, he quickly assented.

C-2 also mentioned a contact that he has about 20 or 30 kms south of Dole on the Dangava. He did not have time to divulge this in [] last contact debriefing. It was agreed to discuss this new contact later.

17:20 two [] called C-1 and C-2 together to confirm the operational agreement. The two, at C-2's initiative, ceremoniously shook hands on the deal. [] re-emphasized that C-2 is the absolute leader and that C-1's primary mission is to support C-2.

C-1 brought up the point that it should be understood that C-2 should not have knowledge of C-1's W/T base, his local movements, etc. Both [] and C-2 readily agreed to this and [] assured C-1 that he would plan his own base, time of contacts, local supporters, etc.

18:00-- Supper

19:00-- Review of medical kits before pouching.

20:00-- Talk with CAMUSO 3 [] was not here during this interview because he drove CAMBARO 2 home for laundry. [] told C-3 that we had intentionally allowed him to see his wife for the last time without really knowing that it is the last time. (last weekend). He emphasized how sorry we were to deal in this manner but that it was to C-3's own good and the good of the operation both from the point of security and C-3's emotions. C-3 showed a little emotion (he is not at all demonstrative) but took it with good grace. C-3 said that he personally expected [] to arrive just at about the time he did and therefore expected to go home at least once after [] arrived. He had even planned to eat a Special cake this weekend which his wife is going to bake. They discussed the feasibility of sending pre-written letters to C-3's wife with suitable cover. C-3 agreed with the principle and the details were left to a later discussion.

[] explained that he had been working on C-3's wife's immigration and said that a serious hitch had developed in that in as much as C-3 was not legally married to his wife, it was unlikely for her to immigrate under present rules. However, [] said that a new law, effective next December, might help because it contains a clause admitting people of interest to various U.S. agencies. Therefore, [] was unable to absolutely insure C-3's wife's immigration but assured him that he, [] would personally do all in his power in the future.

At this point [] said in a humorous vein that C-3 should accomplish his mission and get back so that [] would not have the responsibility of C-3's family for life. C-3 took this with good grace [] brought up this point

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because once in a previous talk when C-3 was under minor influence of alcohol, he had mentioned that he was going on this mission with the feeling that he will never return. [] reminded him of this statement.

Discussion of the operation:

C-3 has one mission to accomplish, at all cost to attempt to contact the Catholic resistance in Southern Latgale. C-3 answered that the Catholics were historically known to have organized good resistance to persecution and that the Catholics were his safest bet. (He is himself an Evangelical- Lutheran) C-3 expressed satisfaction with this plan.

[] then said that C-3 will have 50,000 roses for himself and 50,000 to turn over to the Catholics in the event that contact is made. Then [] said that C-3 would walk about 40km. from the DZ with his gear, cache it, and take a train to Riga. The roses for the Catholics will be cached separately so that they can be recovered independently when feasible or necessary. Then they discussed possibilities of going by train from Riga to Abilene, the details to be worked out later.

[] then stated the advantages of exfiltrating a key man from the Catholics and the possibility of C-3 bringing this man out. [] then said "If things go well, you might not want to come out". C-3 answered, "Yes, if things go well you may not be able to get me out with 7 strong hemp ropes." [] answered that in any eventuality, regarding exfiltration, we would be guided by what C-3 said. C-3 said that among other things a request to be exfiltrated will depend on how his nerves stand up. All in all [] feels fairly certain that CAMUSO 3 will comply with any orders we may transmit to him by W/T or other means of communication.

[] then said that a dead drop in Riga between Camusos 2 and 3 would be set up before they go in as an emergency means of communication.

[] then said that C-3 would be the group leader for the first two days until they break up. C-3 opposed this on the grounds that C-1 was a former officer and should therefore have the honor. [] said that past standing had no validity now and C-3 agrees this was made clear to all agents when they entered training. Then C-3 said that he felt resentment from C-1 when he C-3 was leader of the Grafenwohr problem. [] then asked C-3 in confidence, "Would you in my place pick C-1 as leader in view of his record in training?" C-3 indicated that he would not and then accepted the job as leader with a statement "you're the boss". This interview ended at 20:45.

21:00- 22:00 The agents packed their maps.

22:00- 23:00 Agents checked out on night commo procedure by

23:50-- [] went home because there was no place to sleep at the operational house. [] had CAMBARO 2 announce that as of next evening 23 July, he would leave as per the former agreement. Everyone accepted it well except C-3 who seemed to be a bit disturbed. He quibbled a bit but finally it was OKed by all. Later in the Evening [] discussed ammunition in terms of

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